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Abstract
We systematically review the recent empirical literature to investigate whether and how 
securitization influences bank behaviour and its implication on financial stability. We find that, 
in the years preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis, banks with higher credit and market risk 
were more likely to securitize assets. Banks became riskier and increased systemic risk as they 
took advantage of securitization in order to obtain capital relief. There is robust evidence 
indicating that mortgage securitization led to a deterioration in bank lending standards via 
weaker screening, lower denial rates, and misreporting of credit quality. For corporate loan 
securitization, the empirical findings on lax bank lending are inconclusive. However, it is 
evident that securitization resulted in poorer ex-post bank monitoring of corporate borrowers. 
Even though Europe is the second largest securitization market, there is a dearth of evidence 
on the impact of securitization on European banks’ lending behaviour. Research is also very 
limited on the post-crisis regulatory incentive aligning mechanisms such as the risk retention 
requirements and the credit ratings reform. Finally, evidence on securitisation activity in 
emerging markets, such as Latin America and China, where securitization volumes have been 
increasing recently, is relatively non-existent.
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21  Introduction
Securitization was once regarded as a mechanism that enhanced the resilience and stability of 
the financial system by redistributing risk efficiently.1 Through securitization, banks off-loaded 
credit risk, transformed illiquid assets into saleable securities, reduced their reliance on 
customer deposits and expanded their lending capacity. This process provided an opportunity 
for banks to change their role from traditional lenders to originators and distributors of loans, 
where credit was issued for the sole purpose of securitization. However, the transformation of 
the banking landscape precipitated by securitization had undesirable effects on bank behaviour.  
At the end of 2008, the total stock of private label securitized assets in US and Europe reached 
USD 7.97 trillion. Of that total, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) accounted for 
approximately 65% while securitised corporate loans made up 18%. As of 2017, total 
outstanding securitisations declined to USD 4.29 trillion where securitised mortgages and 
corporate loans comprised 52% and 20% of outstanding volumes respectively.
Securitization is now regarded as one of the main causes of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
Securitization active banks displayed opportunistic behaviour by lowering lending standards 
and selling lower quality collateralised assets to unsuspecting third parties. During the crisis, 
asset-backed securities (ABS), especially those collateralized by mortgages, failed 
catastrophically leading to large losses and the demise of the US and European securitization 
markets. Consequently, it is commonly argued that securitization – by generating subpar assets 
and transferring credit risk to third parties who were not well positioned to manage it – 
increased the fragility of the financial system.  However, this is not a unanimous conclusion as 
some studies have come to opposite conclusions.
In this paper, we survey the burgeoning empirical literature on securitization to examine how 
this innovation influences bank behaviour and its implication on financial stability. We 
contribute to the literature by reviewing the recent empirical evidence in a systematic manner 
to provide a detailed analysis of the findings of the literature about the implications of 
securitization on bank behaviour and financial stability. We follow a systematic literature 
1 Securitization is a process where cash-generating financial assets (such as mortgages, corporate loans, auto loans or credit card receivables) 
– are packaged and sold to third parties as securities which have different risk profiles from the original underlying assets. Cash flows of these 
underlying assets are directed to support the payments on the created securities. 
3review (SLR) approach which adopts a structured process to survey the literature. In our 
analysis, we identify three themes and classify the literature accordingly. First, we investigate 
the drivers of securitization to explore the ex-ante determinants of banks’ decision to securitize 
assets. Second, we examine the ex-post effects of securitization on banks’ financial 
performance and risk. Thirdly, we review the impact of securitization on bank lending 
behaviour. We highlight the implications for financial stability throughout our review.   
By providing a systematic review of the empirical evidence on how securitization may affect 
bank behaviour and financial stability, we also aim to contribute by informing policy debate. 
Today, ten years after the crisis, policy makers are keen to reform and revive the securitization 
market, for its potential benefits to the financial system (see for example ECB, 2014). New 
securitisation regulatory frameworks have been introduced in the US and Europe to ensure 
adequate risk retention, improve information disclosure, increase capital requirements for 
securitizations, and enhance investor due diligence.  Regulators are also promoting the issuance 
of simple, transparent and standardised securitizations, which are less likely to endanger 
financial stability. 
We find that in the pre-financial crisis period, banks that had higher market and credit risks 
were more likely to securitize. Under previous capital adequacy frameworks, banks exploited 
the benefits of securitization to obtain capital relief. Using bank level data, a number of studies 
show that after securitization, banks had higher exposure to market risk and systemic risk. 
Securitization also increased banks’ lending capacity thereby compromising the efficacy of the 
bank-lending channel as a conduit for monetary policy. In the US mortgage markets, 
securitization eroded lending standards via weaker screening of borrowers, lower credit denial 
rates, the sale of poorer quality loans, and the misreporting of borrowers’ creditworthiness. The 
evidence on European mortgage securitization is relatively inadequate and underdeveloped to 
draw substantive conclusions. Concerning the securitization of corporate loans, the evidence 
of lax lending is inconclusive; however, it is evident that securitization resulted in poorer ex-
post bank monitoring of corporate borrowers. Overall, in comparison with the European 
evidence, we observe that empirical evidence from the US is more likely to support the 
undesirable effects of securitization on bank behaviour. 
4Our survey also highlights gaps in the empirical literature. Firstly, the literature on the post-
crisis evolution of securitization pricing and structures is extremely limited. A common 
narrative on the failures of securitisation indicated that investors were overly dependent on 
credit ratings, probably due to the complexity of the securitisation structures. It is unclear 
whether the prices of post-crisis securitisations reflect increased investor due diligence or 
investors are still overly reliant on credit ratings. Secondly, additional empirical evidence is 
needed on agency conflicts2 and the misalignment of incentives along the securitization chain 
in the European market. The paucity of evidence on these conflicts obscures our understanding 
on why securitization’s impact on bank behaviour and financial stability may have differed 
between the US and the European markets. Research on this theme may have important 
implications on enacting relevant and well-informed regulation. Thirdly, empirical evidence 
on emerging markets is almost non-existent, such as Latin America and China, where 
securitization volumes are increasing. Securitisation in these markets are quite different from 
the European and US markets. In China, Securitisation was initially permitted on a pilot basis 
in April 2005, ceased during the 2008 financial crisis, was revived in 2012 and has experienced 
rapid growth since 2014. The market is heavily policy driven as each transaction has to be 
sanctioned by a designated government body. Issuances by financial institutions are traded on 
the interbank market only, resulting in an overlap between issuers and investors and 
overconcentration of risk in the banking sector.3 In Latin America, the securitization markets 
are dominated by transactions from Brazil, Mexico, Columbia and Argentina. As a result of 
exchange rate fluctuations, most issuances are denominated in foreign currencies and are 
limited to the largest and reputable originators. Unlike US and European securitisations, 
transactions in this region rarely secure participation of swap counterparties and liquidity 
providers.4
2 The failure of the housing market has been largely attributed to information-based agency conflicts in the securitization chain. These conflicts 
arise from the asymmetry of information available to each party in the securitization process. This may be evident in the relationship between 
originators and investors with respect to loan quality, and the relationship between appointed servicers and investors with respect to loan 
modification. A series of theoretical works explain how securitization can be incentive compatible by creating information insensitive senior 
tranches for investors and informationally sensitive junior tranches which are retained by the originator to ensure first best monitoring efforts. 
Retention of the riskier tranches can also be interpreted as a signal of asset quality. See Frame (2018) for a discussion of these issues. 
3 With respect to asset classes, the Chinese market is dominated by CLOs –corporate loans/assets – which comprised 55% of issuance volumes 
in 2017. Commercial mortgages securitization does not currently exist and the first residential mortgage backed securitization was closed in 
2015 (Phua, 2018).
4 The development of securitisation market in Latin America has been restrained by deficiencies in legal frameworks, constraints on collateral 
data availability, narrow investor base, political and investor uncertainty, macroeconomic stresses and financial instability. (See Tovar and 
Scatigna, 2007 and de la Torre et al., 2018 for more details).
5The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we explain the systematic literature 
review methodology we follow to conduct our survey. Section 3 presents the literature on the 
ex-ante drivers of banks’ securitization decision. In Section 4 we review the empirical evidence 
presented on the ex-post effects of securitization on bank performance and risk. Subsequently, 
in Section 5, we review studies on the impact of securitization on bank lending behaviour and 
moral hazard. Section 6 concludes and proposes suggestions for further research.  
2  Methodology
We adopt an SLR approach, defined by Macpherson and Jones (2010) and Tranfield et al. 
(2003), to conduct our research. Compared to traditional unstructured reviews, SLR adopts a 
scientific and transparent process by minimizing bias and errors (Tranfield et al., 2003), 
improving the quality of the review process, and providing clear steps for replication (Wang 
and Chugh, 2014). Following studies conducting systematic reviews in other subject areas 
(such as Nolan and Garavan, 2016; Danese et al., 2017), we adopt a structured process as 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
In stage 1, we identify the research objectives of our analysis. The primary objective here is to 
investigate the impact of securitization on financial stability through its effect on bank 
behaviour by reviewing the recent empirical research. Our secondary objective is to classify 
the research examining the link between securitization, bank behaviour and financial stability. 
The third objective is to provide suggestions for further research.  
Figure 1: Stages followed in the systematic literature review 
In stage 2, we set three inclusion criteria: i) We focus on top peer reviewed academic journals 
in the areas of Finance, Economics and Accounting listed in the Journal Quality List, Sixtieth 
Edition (Harzing, 2018). This comprehensive list provides journal rankings based on fourteen 
widely used lists in academia. ii) We only include articles published between 2004 and 2017 
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6to capture research findings that were published around the 2007-2009 financial crisis, iii) We 
use the following combination of keywords for searching titles, keywords and/or abstracts: 
‘securitization’, ‘securitisation’, AND ‘bank’.  We purposefully use general keywords to 
capture as many articles as possible. Our initial search yielded the following number of articles 
published in peer-reviewed journals: 1) ABI/INFORM – 250, 2) ScienceDirect – 77, 3) Wiley 
Online Library – 86 and 4) Emerald Insight – 26. It is worth noting that ABI/INFORM covers 
the other three sources of publishers and therefore most of the papers shown in ABI/INFORM 
are duplicates.
In stage 3, we apply the exclusion criteria. Firstly, we eliminate any research that is not 
examining bank securitization (i.e. non-financial firms’ securitization). Secondly, we are 
interested in empirical studies based on numerical data and quantitative analysis techniques; 
therefore, we exclude pure theoretical research outputs from the data.5 These exclusion criteria 
yield a final sample of 53 peer-reviewed journal articles. 
In stage 4, the quality of the final set of studies is scrutinised by the three researchers 
independently based on publication outlet and content relevance. We present the publication 
outlets for the articles in Table 1. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics regarding the publication year, region, loan type and 
analysis type are presented in. We observe that 68% of the articles we identified have a US 
focus and a majority (73.5%) of them were published after the 2007-2009 crisis.  
At the last stage, articles in the sample are classified into themes based on the research 
questions, analysis and focus of our paper. This process is first undertaken independently by 
each researcher. The results are then compared and a final classification is achieved by 
resolving any differences by discussion. We identify three themes as shown in Table 3. We 
group the first strand of literature under the heading of “Ex-ante determinants of bank 
securitization”. These studies examine banks’ motivation to undertake securitization. This is a 
key and relevant question in understanding the impact of securitization on bank behaviour and 
5 Even though the theoretical literature is not included in our data, we utilise this literature in our discussions of findings. 
7financial stability, especially in understanding whether riskier banks are more likely to 
securitise.
    Table 1: Publication outlet
Journal title Count Share
Journal of Financial Services Research 9 16.98%
Journal of Financial Economics 6 11.32%
Review of Financial Studies 6 11.32%
Journal of Banking and Finance 4 7.55%
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 3 5.66%
Journal of Finance 3 5.66%
European Journal of Finance 3 5.66%
Journal of Financial Intermediation 2 3.77%
Journal of Financial Stability 2 3.77%
Journal of International Money and Finance 2 3.77%
Journal of Monetary Economics 2 3.77%
Quarterly Journal of Economics 2 3.77%
European Economic Review 1 1.89%
European Financial Management 1 1.89%
Insurance and Risk Management 1 1.89%
International Review of Financial Analysis 1 1.89%
Journal of Business Economics and Management 1 1.89%
Journal of Real Estate Research 1 1.89%
Journal of Risk Finance 1 1.89%
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 1 1.89%
Review of Finance 1 1.89%
Total 53 100%
       Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Count Share   Count Share
Region Publication year
US 36 67.92% 2004 2 3.77%
Europe (multi-country) 6 11.32% 2005 1 1.89%
Italy 5 9.43% 2006 1 1.89%
Spain 4 7.55% 2007 2 3.77%
Canada 1 1.89% 2008 2 3.77%
Global 1 1.89% 2009 6 11.32%
2010 3 5.66%
Level of analysis 2011 4 7.55%
Loan 30 56.60% 2012 7 13.21%
Bank 23 43.40% 2013 4 7.55%
2014 2 3.77%
Type of loans 2015 10 18.87%
All 23 43.40% 2016 6 11.32%
Mortgages 20 37.74% 2017 3 5.66%
Corporate 8 15.09%  Total  53 100.0% 
Credit card 1 1.89%
SME loans 1 1.89%
8The second category includes studies that examine the “Ex-post effects of securitization on 
banks”. This strand of the literature particularly looks at how banks’ idiosyncratic risk changes 
after securitization and the impact of this change on the systemic risk of the overall financial 
system. The final category includes studies that investigate the impact of securitization on bank 
lending behaviour. This literature primarily examines how the lending decision changes due to 
the information frictions induced by securitisation. Given that asset-backed securities are sold 
to third parties situated in various segments of the financial system, the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems associated with the disconnect between the originator and the ultimate 
investor may lead to weaker bank lending standards and, therefore, adversely impact financial 
stability.
    
                     Table 3: Identified themes
Theme Number of papers*
Ex-ante determinants of bank securitization 9
Ex-post effects of securitization on banks 24
The effect of securitization on bank lending behaviour 24
*4 papers are categorised in two groups, leading to a total of 55 observations in this table.
3  Ex-ante determinants of bank securitization
In Table 4 we present a summary of the findings of the studies in the literature that examines 
the ex-ante determinants of bank securitization. This literature highlights funding costs, 
liquidity, capital levels, bank size and profitability as the main financial determinants of bank 
securitization.  
Theoretical studies highlight cost of funding as a common motivating factor as securitization 
can be used to fund loan portfolios at lower costs relative to funding via deposits, debt or equity 
(Benveniste and Berger, 1987; Pennacchi, 1988; Jones, 2000; Shin, 2009). Also, empirical 
studies confirm that banks can effectively decrease the cost of funding through the 
diversification of funding sources through securitization (Agostino and Mazzuca, 2008; 
Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010; Loutskina, 2011), and by circumventing costs arising from 
deposit insurance and reserve requirements (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Casu et al., 2013).
Banks can also use securitization as an additional funding channel to address their liquidity 
needs. Banks may sell loans in order to fund their assets in response to shocks to the supply or 
9costs of deposits (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010). Multiple empirical studies consistently find 
that banks engage in securitization to improve their liquidity positions (Cardone-Riportella et 
al., 2010; Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Casu et al., 2013; Farruggio and Uhde, 2015).
   
Table 4: Ex-ante determinants of banks’ securitization decision        
This table summarises the main findings of the literature that examines the determinants of bank securitization decision. Determinants of securitization are 
sub-categorized as funding costs, liquidity, capital level, size, credit risk and profitability. These measures may have been proxied by different variables in each 
of the studies. Arrows indicate the direction of the relationship between the measures and the probability, or volume, of securitization activity. For example, 
a  for liquidity indicates that a bank with lower liquidity is more likely to be active in the securitization market.
Authors, date Data  
Period Region Level Loans  
Funding costs
Liquidity
Capital level
Credit Risk
Size
Profitability
Calomiris and Mason, 2004 1996-2000 US Bank Credit card 
Uzun and Webb, 2007 2001-2005 US Bank All  
Agostino and Mazzuca, 2008  1999-2006 Italy Bank All   
Loutskina and Strahan, 2009 1992-2004 US Loan Mortgages  
Minton et al., 2009 2000-2003 US Bank All  
Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010 2000-2007 Spain Bank All  
Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010 2000-2006 Italy Bank All     
Casu et al., 2013 2001-2008 US Bank All     
Farruggio and Uhde, 2015 1997-2010 Europe Bank All    
Furthermore, prior to the Basel III regime, banks have often used securitization to circumvent 
minimum capital requirements through regulatory capital arbitrage, thereby reducing cost of 
financing (Pennacchi, 1988; Jones, 2000; Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Ambrose et al., 2005; 
Watson and Carter, 2006; Uzun and Webb, 2007).6 This practice was quite commonplace under 
the Basel I regime, where it was more expensive to hold less risky assets (Cardone-Riportella 
et al., 2010). Evidently, banks used securitization with recourse to determine optimal capital 
ratios that matched markets’ risk perception as opposed to regulatory capital requirements 
(Calomiris and Mason, 2004). However, Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010), based on the 
European data, find a negative relationship between capital levels and the likelihood of 
securitization. Nevertheless, they argue that their analysis does not necessarily imply regulatory 
capital arbitrage where capital levels are reduced without corresponding reduction in risks. 
They contend that securitization was mostly used to satisfy funding and liquidity needs, and to 
diversify funding sources. On the contrary, studies based on US data uniformly report a 
negative relationship between capital levels and probability of securitization (Calomiris and 
6 See Jones (2000), Minton et al. (2004) and Acharya and Richardson (2009) for an extended discussion of how pre-Basel III capital regulations 
allowed bank to maintain less capital through regulatory capital arbitrage. 
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Mason, 2004; Uzun and Webb, 2007; Casu et al., 2013), indicating that regulatory arbitrage 
was a key motivation for US banks. 
Securitization was effectively a channel for riskier banks to offload risk to third parties. They 
obtained easier access to the capital markets via securitization because asset-backed securities 
usually carried higher ratings than the issuing bank (Choudhry et al., 2014). Banks were also 
more likely to securitize loans when bearing the associated risk of an asset was considered to 
be undesirable (Parlour and Plantin, 2008); hence, they may use securitization to channel risk 
onto third parties at fair value (Jobst, 2006; Martín-Oliver and Saurina, 2007; Hansel and 
Bannier, 2008). Empirical evidence consistently shows that banks holding loan portfolios with 
higher credit risk are more likely to engage in securitization activity regardless of the country 
or region (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Casu et al., 2013). An exception to these conclusions 
is Faruggio and Uhde (2015) who report a negative relationship between credit risk and 
securitization volume. It is worth noting that these papers use different indicators to measure 
credit risk.7 The apparent distinction between the results of Faruggio and Uhde (2015) and 
other studies seem to be sample size and context. Faruggio and Uhde (2015) evaluates a sample 
of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) issued by 75 listed European Banks from 1997 – 
2010. The closest work to Farrugio and Uhde (2015) is Hansel and Bannier (2008) who 
examine a larger sample of 243 European banks from 1997 – 2004. A notable difference 
between these two studies is the inclusion of the post-crisis period by Faruggio and Uhde 
(2015). The motivation for securitisation may have changed after the crisis as banks became 
less aggressive and focused more on reducing credit risk. Hence, Faruggio and Uhde (2015) 
results may be influenced by new circumstances in the post-crisis period. 
Bank size has also been found to be significant determinants of securitization in the empirical 
literature. The empirical studies unanimously show that larger banks are more likely to 
securitize and issue collateralised securities in higher volumes (Uzun and Webb 2007; Minton 
et al., 2009; Casu et al., 2013; Farruggio and Uhde, 2015). Evidence on the role of profitability 
as a motivating factor for securitization is ambiguous (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Casu et 
al., 2013; Farruggio and Uhde, 2015).  Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010) argue that banks with 
lower return on equity (ROE) are likely to resort to loan securitization to boost returns. 
7 The following indicators are used in each of the studies: Credit risk provision relative to net interest income (Hansel and Bannier, 2008); net 
charge offs (Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010); bad loans to total loans (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010); nonperforming loans to total loans (Minton 
et al., 2009; Casu et al., 2013); loan loss reserves to total loans (Faruggio and Uhde, 2015). 
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However, it is worth noting that their results are based on a single country (Italy) sample and 
may be driven by the banking sector characteristics in that country. Farruggio and Uhde (2015) 
studies a cross-country sample covering 14 European markets and finds (albeit only at the 10% 
significance level) that in the pre-crisis period ROE was positively related to the volume of 
securitization. For US banks, Casu et al., (2013) do not find ROE to be a significant determinant 
of the securitization decision. Differences in results regarding profitability may be driven by 
sample choices of these studies, hence more comprehensive empirical evidence is needed to 
establish the link between profitability and securitization.
Overall, a series of empirical studies analysing the US and European markets provide similar 
evidence on the determinants of securitization using pre-crisis data. However, our knowledge 
on the banks securitization decision is especially limited for the post-crisis period. Only 
Farruggio and Uhde (2015) provides post-financial crisis evidence; however, their study 
examines the period of 2009-2010 when the European securitization market was mostly inert 
as issuances had declined by approximately 50% from 2008 levels. Furthermore, US evidence 
is non-existent in for the period following the financial crisis.
  
Conclusions drawn from this strand of literature on the financial stability implications of 
securitization can be interpreted as positive. Based on the literature reviewed above, it can be 
argued that banks tend to use securitization to manage various risks by modifying their 
liquidity, capital and credit risk levels. However, it has been argued that securitization, 
destabilised the soundness of the banking system, and was a leading factor triggering the 2007-
2009 financial crisis (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, FCIC, 2011). Therefore, the ex-
post securitization effects may have deviated from the expectations of issuing banks. These 
effects are explored in Section 4 below.
4  Ex-post effects of securitization on banks
As discussed in Section 3, risk-shifting is one of the main motivations of securitization, but do 
banks’ risk levels decrease after securitization? This is explained by three key transmission 
mechanisms. First, the retention of the first loss piece as an incentive-aligning device 
determines the effective risk transferred by securitisation. Second, the reinvestment of 
securitization proceeds in new projects with higher/lower risk relative to the risk of the 
12
securitized portfolio influences the risk of the loans on the balance sheet. Finally, the use of 
credit risk transfer to effectively reduce capital buffers without corresponding changes in risk 
levels undermined the loss-absorbing objective of required regulatory capital. In Table 5, we 
present a summary of the findings of the literature examining the ex-post effects of 
securitization on bank financials and risks. We identify these effects as credit and other bank 
risks, equity risk, capital requirements, profitability, lending ability and issuer lending rates. 
Securitization is designed to insulate the originator from the performance of the underlying 
assets. Therefore, if banks intend to close future transactions, they should be inclined to 
securitise high quality loans, while building their reputation.  However, theoretical studies 
show that this tendency results in the retention of riskier loans which in turn increases banks’ 
risks (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; DeMarzo, 2005; Instefjord, 2005). Retention of the first 
loss piece is also an important mechanism in securitization transactions because it aligns the 
incentives of the issuing bank with the interests of investors (Parlour and Plantin, 2008; 
DeMarzo, 2005; Malekan and Dionne, 2014). However, retention leads to an accretion of credit 
risk on the balance sheet thereby making banks weaker and vulnerable to economic downturns. 
Recent empirical evidence finds that the risk profile of securitizing banks are higher for a given 
level of capital after securitization (Calem and LaCour-Little, 2004; Dionne and Harchaoui, 
2008; Purnanandam, 2011; Michalak and Uhde, 2012; Agarwal et al., 2012; Casu et al., 2013; 
Battaglia and Gallo, 2013).8 Evidence also shows that keeping riskier loans was driven by the 
lack of risk differentiation and capital requirements that were perceived to be excessive during 
the pre-crisis period (Basel I and later Basel II). Consequently, banks sought to exploit the 
benefits of asset securitisation in order to obtain capital relief. 
A second factor related to increasing risks is the banks’ reinvestment policy after securitization. 
Using simulations, Franke and Krahnen (2005) find that banks increase their risk profile by 
reinvesting securitization proceeds into granting additional loans rather than investing in risk-
free assets or repaying their debt. Empirical evidence shows that prior to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, banks’ credit risk increased by holding riskier loans and lending to riskier 
8 Furthermore, retention is found to be inefficient during boom periods (Kuncl, 2015) since asset quality remains unobservable and financial 
institutions accumulate risky assets on their balance sheet. Reputational concerns should serve as incentives for optimal equity retention; 
however, evidence shows that retained tranches were usually sold or hedged using credit derivatives (Fender and Mitchell, 2009).
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Table 5: Ex-post effects of securitization on banks financial and risk
This table summarises the main findings of the literature that examines the ex-post effects of bank securitization on bank financials and risk. The effects are sub-categorized as credit risk, 
overall bank risk, equity (systematic) risk, capital levels required, profitability, lending ability and issuer lending rates. These measures may have been proxied by different variables in each of 
the studies. Arrows indicate the direction of the relationship between ex-post securitization and the specific indicator. For example, a  for credit risk indicates that after securitization bank 
credit risk increases.
Authors, date  Data  
  Period Region level Loans  
Capital level required
Credit and O
ther 
bank risk
E
quity risk
Profitability
Lending ability
Issuer lending rates
Calem and LaCour-Little, 2004  1993-1998 US Loan All  
Stiroh, 2006 1997-2004 US Bank All 
Dionne and Harchaoui, 2008  1988-1998 Canada Bank All   
Altunbas et al., 2009  1999-2005 Europe Loan All   
Martinez-Solano et al., 2009  1993–2004 Spain Bank All  
Loutskina, 2011  1976-2007 US Bank All  
Shivdasani and Wang, 2011  1996-2008 US Loan Corporate   
Wu et al., 2011 2002-2007 US Bank All 
Purnanandam, 2011  2006-2008 US Bank Mortgages  
Michalak and Uhde, 2012  1997-2007 Europe Loan All    
Nadauld and Weisbach, 2012 2002-2007 US Loan Corporate 
Agarwal et al., 2012  2004-2007 US Loan Mortgages  
Carbó-Valverde et al., 2012 2000-2010 Spain Bank All 
Zarutskie, 2013 1976-2003 US Loan Mortgages  
Casu et al., 2013 2001-2008 US Bank All  
Battaglia and Gallo, 2013  2000-2009 Italy Bank All   
Wang and Xia, 2015  2000-2007 US Loan Corporate  
Baradwaj et al., 2015 2001-2010 US Bank SME loans 
Termos and Saad, 2016 1985-2005 US Bank Mortgages 
Trapp and Weiss, 2016  2006 US Bank All  
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette, 2016 2007-2008 Italy Bank All  
Iglesias-Casal et al., 2016  1993-2010 Spain Loan Mortgages  
Chen et al., 2017 2002-2012 US Bank All 
Le et al., 2017  2001-2012 US Bank All  
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borrowers (Dionne and Harchaoui, 2008; Le et al., 20179). Securitization also decreases banks’ 
financial soundness (measured by Z-score) and increases return volatility (Michalak and Uhde, 
2012).  For the US market, Chen et al. (2017) finds that even though securitization active banks 
had relatively lower short-term risk (measured by Z-score), it significantly increased the 
probability of bank failure in the long run. Due to risk retention, securitization active banks 
have higher expected losses in case extreme events (tail risk) occur (Battaglia and Gallo, 2013), 
and hold less diversified loan portfolios after securitization (Casu et al., 2013). 
Another strand of literature empirically investigates whether securitization increased banks’ 
systematic risk – measured using equity beta. Studies find that in the European market, stock 
betas increase for banks that use securitization proceeds to fund new loans, indicating that the 
market perceives this as taking on more risk. Battaglia and Gallo (2013) (using marginal 
expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk) and Iglesias-Casal et al. (2016) find that 
securitization increases the probability of Italian and Spanish banks respectively becoming 
systematically riskier. Similarly, US banks that securitized loans prior to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis suffered greater losses on their stocks on days when the market plummeted 
during the crisis (Stiroh, 2006; Trapp and Weiss, 2016). On the contrary, We et al. (2011), 
examining the 2002-2007 period in US banks, find that securitizing banks had lower systematic 
betas until 2007. However, they identify a structural break in 2007, when securitizing banks 
experienced jumps in both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Overall, the literature generally 
indicates that securitizing active banks are more likely to be non-trivial contributors to a 
systemic crisis. 
In terms of performance, securitization should theoretically have a positive effect on bank 
profitability. Pooling loans and allocating cash flows across varied financial claims can 
enhance a bank’s expected revenue in the presence of information asymmetries (Boot and 
Thakor, 1993). In order to maximise returns on assets, banks can utilize securitization to 
systematically pool and sell newly originated or existing assets on a continuously, thereby 
increasing income for given levels of equity (Wolfe, 2000). Empirical evidence shows that 
securitization increased the expectation of profitability (Martinez-Solano et al., 2009).  In 
contrast, Michalak and Uhde (2012) find that securitization lowers the profitability of European 
9 Le et al. (2017) also looks at the post-crisis period of 2009-2012 and do not find evidence of securitization leading to increase in credit 
risk.
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banks while increasing earnings volatility. According to the authors, securitizing banks 
retaining a large portion of the credit risk and subsequently following risky reinvestment 
strategies may decrease profits as a result of higher probability of loan losses. This 
contradiction between two studies’ findings is most likely due to the different measures used. 
Martinez-Solano et al. (2009) conduct an event study assessing stock returns of Spanish banks 
where positive cumulative abnormal returns around announcement dates are interpreted as 
investors’ expectations about profits. Michalak and Uhde (2012) actually take a direct approach 
by assessing the effect of securitization on return on assets and find a negative relationship. In 
this case, the evidence suggests that actual returns fell short of expected returns.
Securitization income may also enhance revenues by lessening the underinvestment10 problem 
and, thereby, reducing the cost of equity (Lockwood et al., 1996). Empirical evidence shows 
that securitization modified banks’ access to capital which led to relaxed lending constraints, 
increased loan supply (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011; Zarutskie, 2013; Baradwaj et al., 2015; 
Termos and Saad, 2016) and lower lending rates between 2004 and 2007 (Shivdasani and 
Wang, 2011; Nadauld and Weisbach, 2012; Zarutskie, 2013). 
Loutskina and Strahan (2009) and Loutskina (2011) find that prior to the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, securitization increased US banks’ lending ability and made lending less sensitive to 
cost of funding shocks. European and international evidence also find that securitization active 
banks increased their loan levels in the period before the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Altunbas 
et al., 2009; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2012). The argument here is that securitization active banks 
were larger and had access to higher liquidity at lower costs. Consequently, they increased their 
lending supply in order to fund more securitizations. The pliability of this channel largely 
insulated these banks from the cost of funds from other sources. One exception to this narrative 
is Bonaccorsi di Patti and Settle (2016). These authors examine the impact of securitization on 
bank behaviour during the crisis period of 2007-2008. They find that securitization-active 
banks tightened credit supply and increased lending rates during this period.
10 The underinvestment refers to an agency problem where the bank forgoes profitable projects because of possible wealth transfer to 
debtholders (depositors) from shareholders. The argument here is that securitization allow banks to issue debt claims senior to depositors’ 
claims. The risks to depositors is reduced as funding from securitization may be directed to projects that would have been forgone otherwise 
as a result of a possible wealth transfer from shareholders to depositors.
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The ability to increase loan supply via securitization may pose a risk to financial stability 
through its weakening effect on monetary policy. The credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission operates through changes in bank lending. The effectiveness of the bank lending 
channel for the purposes of monetary policy transmission can be eroded when banks can raise 
funds through securitization. In Europe, during the pre-crisis period, the use of securitization 
sheltered banks’ loan supply from the effects of monetary policy (Altunbas et al., 2009).  In 
the US, the ability of monetary policy to influence the credit supply was also restricted by 
securitization. Loutskina (2011) finds that banks with more liquid portfolios exhibited higher 
loan growth during periods of monetary tightening. However, these banks became vulnerable 
to liquidity and funding crises as securitization, one of their key sources of funding, dried up 
during the 2007-2009 crisis (Loutskina, 2011).11 
In sum, this strand of the empirical literature agrees on the various implications of securitization 
for bank soundness and financial stability. Firstly, there is clear evidence that securitization 
increased banks’ credit and systematic risk both in the US and European markets. Secondly, 
evidence drawn both from US and European studies confirms the capital arbitrage effect of 
securitization. Thirdly, it is evident that through securitization, banks’ increased their lending 
capacity in both regions. Once more, a gap in the literature here is the paucity of research 
examining the relationship between securitization and bank risk in the post-crisis period. 
Although issuance volumes have declined significantly compared to the pre-crisis years, the 
securitisation markets have been gradually gaining momentum, especially after 2010. An 
exception is the study by Le et al. (2017) that examines the period of 2009-2012 and do not 
find evidence of securitization increasing banking risks. The post-crisis period has been largely 
characterized by regulatory tightening and reforms aimed at strengthening the financial system. 
Consequently, it is imperative to investigate the extent to which securitization results in risk 
transfer during this period of regulatory reform, and whether securitization remains an effective 
tool for arbitraging regulatory capital. This line of research is especially important as regulators 
have now specified minimum retention ratio relative to originator-determined retention ratio 
during the pre-crisis era. Another interesting empirical undertaking would be to assess the 
reinvestment tendencies of securitization active banks across multiple regulatory regimes.
11 It is also shown that the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission is stronger for U.S. banks that securitize their assets (Aysun and 
Hepp, 2011).
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5  Securitization and bank lending behaviour
We present a summary of the empirical studies on the impact of securitization on bank lending 
behaviour in Table 6. We identify five arguments from the literature as follows: adverse 
selection, screening incentives, monitoring incentives, misreporting and covenant strength. 
Securitization may distort bank lending behaviour by incentivising opportunistic behaviour at 
the expense of ABS investors. Theoretical models establish the link between the decline in 
credit quality and the financial crisis. For instance, Shin (2009) demonstrates that securitization 
may not improve financial stability if the imperative to grow bank balance sheets compromises 
lending standards. Also, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010) show that while securitization 
enhances risk sharing within the financial sector; it can also lead to higher leverage levels 
thereby increasing bank risks. Thus, securitization enables banks to reduce their capital levels 
for given levels of risk, which essentially translates to higher leverage and a build-up of 
systemic risk (through a widespread accumulation of risky assets as a proportion of total 
assets).
A number of studies empirically investigate the link between securitization and lax lending 
standards.12 In the years prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, securitization active US banks 
originated low quality mortgages that suffered higher default rates subsequently (Keys et al., 
2009, 2010, 2012; Purnanandam, 2011).  For example, in the pre-crisis period, default rates of 
mortgage loans increased by about 10 to 25 percent if a securitized bank doubled its 
securitization volume (Keys et al., 2010). However, it is worth noting that these studies have 
multiple limitations. For example, Keys et al. (2009, 2010, 2012) rely on samples of securitised 
subprime mortgages only, hence their inferences might by skewed due to selection bias. 
Therefore, it is unclear  from  their  evidence  whether  lending  standards  also  declined  for  
non-securitised mortgages.13 Also, Purnanandam (2011) does not control for observable 
characteristics –such as LTV, FICO scores or loan type– and, therefore, it is unclear whether 
the decline in quality is due to declining lending standards or the origination of observably poor 
quality loans.
12 Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) also find that low short-term interest rates soften standards for household and corporate loans and this is 
amplified by securitization. 
13 Also, they only use data on originations (successful loan applications) hence the extent to which the lending decision can be credibly assessed 
is limited.
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Table 6: Effects of securitization on bank lending behaviour  
This table summarises the main findings of the literature that examines the effects of securitization on bank lending behaviour. The effects are sub-categorized as adverse selection, 
screening incentives, monitoring incentives, misreporting, covenant strength, and rating shopping/favours. These measures may have been proxied by different variables in each of the 
studies. Arrows indicate the direction of the relationship between securitization and the specific bank behaviour. For example, a  screening incentives means that securitization 
reduced banks’ screening incentives. Yes (No) indicates whether the sub-category is found (not observed) in the study.
Authors, date  Data  
  Period Region Level Loans  
A
dverse selection 
Screening incentives
M
onitoring incentives
M
isreporting
Covenant strength
Rating 
shopping/favours
Ambrose et al., 2005  1995-2000 US Loan Mortgages  Yes     
Mian and Sufi, 2009  1998-2007 US Loan Mortgages  Yes 
Keys et al., 2009 2001-2006 US Loan Mortgages Yes 
Keys et al., 2010  2000-2006 US Loan Mortgages  Yes 
Purnanandam, 2011  2006-2008 US Bank Mortgages  Yes 
Shivdasani and Wang, 2011  1996-2008 US Loan Corporate  No 
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012  2000-2006 US Loan Mortgages  Yes 
Agarwal et al., 2012  2004-2007 US Loan Mortgages  Yes
Benmelech et al., 2012  1997-2007 US Loan Corporate  No
Keys et al., 2012 2000-2006 US Loan Mortgages Yes 
Nadauld and Sherlund, 2013  2003-2005 US Loan Mortgages  Yes 
Krainer and Laderman, 2014  2000-2007 US Loan Mortgages  Yes
Kamstra et al., 2014  1994-2004 US Loan Corporate   
Wang and Xia, 2015  2000-2007 US Loan Corporate   
Efing and Hau, 2015 1991-2011 US &Europe Loan All Yes
Elul, 2015  2005-2006 US Loan Mortgages  Yes
Albertazzi et al., 2015  1996-2006 Italy Loan Mortgages  No
Bord and Santos, 2015  2004-2008 US Loan Corporate  Yes  
Griffin and Maturana, 2016  2002-2011 US Loan Mortgages    Yes  
Piskorski et al., 2015  2005-2007 US Loan Mortgages     Yes  
Fabozzi et. Al, 2015 1999-2006 Europe Loan Mortgages No
He et al., 2016 2004-2006 US Loan Mortgages Yes
Kara et al., 2016  2000-2009 Europe Loan Corporate  No     
Kara et al., 2017  2005-2007 Europe Loan Corporate  No     
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There is also evidence that securitization decreased denial rates in mortgage applications during 
the pre-crisis period (Mian and Sufi, 2009; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012; Nadauld and Sherlund, 
2013).14 Using US data, these studies show that areas (proxied by zip codes) with negative 
relative income and employment growth experienced decreases in denial rates and increases in 
mortgage approvals. This trend was driven by a relative increase in the portion of mortgages 
securitised by banks soon after origination. Banks also securitized their (ex-ante) riskiest 
mortgages (Ambrose et al., 2005; Agarwal et al., 2012; Krainer and Laderman, 2014; Elul, 
2015). These studies find that mortgages that were securitized had higher prepayment risk and 
performed worse in comparison to non-securitized mortgages. The only exception to this 
narrative is Albertazzi et al., (2015). The authors do not find any evidence of adverse selection 
in the Italian mortgage securitization market. Overall, there is substantial evidence that prior to 
the financial crisis, securitization of mortgages reduced lenders’ incentives to screen borrowers 
carefully.
In contrast to mortgage lending, there is evidence suggesting that securitization did not lead to 
riskier lending in the corporate loan market and adverse selection problems seems to be less 
severe (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011; Benmelech et al., 2012; Kara et al., 2016; Kara et al., 
2017). For example, in the US market, securitized corporate loans experienced lower ex-post 
defaults than those retained in banks’ balance sheets (Benmelech et al., 2012). Empirical 
evidence based on European data also show that banks did not securitize low quality corporate 
loans (Kara et al., 2016; Kara et al., 2017). On the contrary, Bord and Santos (2015) argue that 
securitization led to lax underwriting standards in corporate loans. They find that in the US, 
during the boom years of CLO issuance, securitized loans underperformed relative to 
unsecuritized loans by the same bank.15 
A reduction in monitoring intensity of borrowers whose loans are securitized may impair credit 
quality. Theoretical studies show that banks reduce monitoring after loan sales (Gorton and 
Pennacchi, 1995; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Morrison, 2005; Chiesa, 2008) and there is 
supportive empirical evidence from the US (Kamstra et al., 2014; Wang and Xia, 2015) and 
14 Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) is relatively superior as their dataset includes securitised and non-securitised prime and subprime mortgages. 
Furthermore, their sample comprises denied loan applications; therefore, they are able to provide a better assessment of the lending decision, 
rather than studies that assess successful applications (or originations) only. Relatedly, Mian and Sufi (2009) and Nadauld and Sherlund  (2013) 
arrive at their conclusions based on aggregate data while Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) uses disaggregated loan level data.
15 Related to this literature, it is found that there may be positive incentive effects when originators are affiliated with sponsors or servicers of 
the ABS (Demiroglu and James, 2012).
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Europe (Kara et al., 2017). Broadly speaking, banks imposed looser loan covenants at 
origination (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011; Wang and Xia, 2015), and borrowers from 
securitization active banks took on significantly more risk. 
Securitization active banks also showed other forms of opportunistic behaviour through 
misreporting and fraud in ABSs issued in the pre-crisis period. For example, in the US, 
approximately 10 to 30 percent of mortgages in residential mortgage pools were misreported 
(Griffin and Maturana, 2015; Piskorski et al., 2015) and banks persistently withheld pertinent 
information from investors as securitised loan pools were riskier than represented (Griffin and 
Maturana, 2016).16 
The literature also scrutinizes the conflict of interests that may arise due to close relationships 
between the banks and rating agencies. In the securitization process, the issuer-pay structure of 
compensation may lead to additional misaligned interests (He et al., 2016; Efing and Hau, 
2015).17 For example, it is argued that banks shopped for ratings and only reported favourable 
ones (He et al., 2016). Relatedly, it has been documented that credit rating agencies issued 
rating favours to larger banks and to banks that secured ratings on a significant number of 
securitization deals from them (He et al., 2016; Efing and Hau, 2015).18 In contrast, Fabozzi et 
al., (2015) find evidence inconsistent with the rating shopping hypothesis in the European 
market.
Summarising this strand of literature, there is strong evidence that US banks securitizing 
mortgages loosened their lending standards due to securitization. They weakened screening, 
bundled lower quality loans into MBSs and in some cases misreported the initial quality of the 
mortgages. In corporate loan securitization, evidence of lax lending is inconclusive with 
majority of studies reporting no adverse selection. However, banks reduced monitoring efforts 
on securitised corporate loans. Additionally, the European evidence is less likely to report 
negative influences of securitization. Similar to our remarks in the above sections, empirical 
evidence on these relationships in the post-crisis period is non-existent. Furthermore, there are 
16 There is also evidence that borrowers of mortgages made inaccurate declarations on applications (Jiang et al., 2013; Griffin and Maturana, 
2016).
17 The accuracy of credit ratings has also been examined as they were inaccurate in assessing ABS risks (Brennan et al., 2009; Coval et al., 
2009a; Coval et al., 2009b).
18 Relatedly, Ashcraft et al. (2010) find a progressive decline in rating standards around the MBS market peak between the start of 2005 and 
mid-2007.
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only a handful of studies that examines the European banks behaviour, both in mortgage and 
corporate loan markets. 
6  Conclusion
In this paper we systematically reviewed the recently developed empirical literature 
investigating the determinants of securitization, the ex-post effects of securitization on bank 
risk, the effects of securitization on bank lending behaviour and securitization’s implication on 
financial stability. Evidently, large banks are most likely to securitise with the intention of 
obtaining liquidity at relatively lower costs. Although, a commonly cited benefit of 
securitization is to reduce credit risk, this mechanism has been found to achieve minimal risk 
transfer due to the use of retention as a signaling device, regulatory capital arbitrage, and the 
reinvestment policies of securitizing banks.  
We find that in the pre- crisis period, securitization active banks had higher exposure to market 
risk and systemic risk. Securitization increased bank lending capacity which undermined 
effectiveness of the lending channel as a monetary transmission mechanism. US banks, 
especially in the mortgage market, relaxed lending standards via weaker screening of 
borrowers, and lower denial rates. They also securitized poorer quality loans and engaged in 
pervasive misrepresentation of these loans. In corporate lending, evidence of lax underwriting 
standards is inconclusive; however, securitization certainly worsened borrower monitoring. 
Securitization led to imbalances in credit markets which increased the fragility of the financial 
system and endangered financial stability over time. As a consequence of banks’ failure to 
conduct their basic monitoring and screening roles, borrowers showed inefficient economic 
behaviour, increasing financial system’s credit risk levels to an unsustainable level. 
Securitization also reinforced the cyclicality of bank equity values, a major component of 
systemic risk in financial system, consequently amplifying banking risks at a systemic level.  
However, securitization yielded the above unfavourable outcomes due to the misalignment of 
incentives and regulatory loopholes. Thus, securitization is not a destabilizing tool per se.
Recent empirical research has enhanced our knowledge on the cost and benefits of bank 
securitization. However, there are still gaps in the literature. We find that the empirical 
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literature in the post 2007-2009 crisis on bank securitization behaviour is extremely limited. 
Our knowledge on whether, and how, securitization structures and pricing has changed since 
the financial crisis is very limited. For example, there has been very limited research on post-
crisis regulatory incentive aligning mechanisms such as the risk retention requirements and the 
credit ratings reform. The risk retention rules have been applicable in the EU since 2011. 
However, little is known on the adequacy of the mandatory retention of an absolute level of 
risk, regardless of the nature of the transaction or collateral. Evidently, securitizing banks 
retained too much risk so mandatory retention, albeit justified, is unlikely to be the complete 
solution.  
Perverse incentives have always existed in financial markets and securitization was used as a 
tool to exploit information asymmetry to the detriment of the financial system. In other words, 
with inadequate oversight, securitization can engender perverse incentives. Therefore, with 
regulatory intervention, securitization could be effectively used to transfer risks to market 
participants who are more suited to bear them, and also to boost lending and, consequently, 
economic growth. In order to achieve this, additional research is required to explain the role of 
agency conflicts, as well as the interaction of these conflicts, in the years leading to the crash. 
This is more likely to inform public policy by delineating pragmatic ways of realigning 
incentives or mitigating further misalignment of interests.  
There are only a handful of studies that examines securitization related bank moral hazard 
issues in Europe. The dearth of evidence in this area obscures our understanding on why 
securitization’s impact on bank behaviour and financial stability differed between the US and 
the European market, and between the mortgage and corporate loans, even though regulatory 
responses are largely similar. We also find that empirical evidence is relatively non-existent on 
emerging markets, such as Latin America and China, where securitization volumes have been 
increasing recently. Additionally, although there is ample research on securitizations’ impact 
on financial stability through the bank channel, it is not clear whether and how securitization 
changes borrower behaviour. 
Also the development of a more non-bank investor base, especially in Europe, should mitigate 
the concentration of risk in the banking sector and diversify sources of funding to the real 
economy. This could be informed by research evaluating the role of a diversified investor base 
on the dispersion of risk in the US and European markets. Each market is unique with respect 
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to the participation of non-bank investor base. These findings can also inform policy debates 
on the segregation of the interbank and capital markets in China with respect to the trading of 
securitized bonds.
Another imperative line of inquiry would be the relative transparency of post-crisis 
securitization as the opacity of pre-crisis transactions was a major criticism, especially on 
multi-layered deals with unwarranted levels of complexity. Disclosures were made on most of 
these complex deals but this did not mitigate poor decision making as the task of sourcing 
relevant information from non-standard prospectuses can be challenging, thereby resulting in 
increased reliance on credit ratings and minimizing due diligence. Policymakers should 
therefore incentivize simplified disclosures and structures without stifling innovation.
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